Personal Torts by Branson, Frank L.
SMU Law Review
Volume 40




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation






N the Survey period there were major developments in Texas negligence
law in the areas of premises liability, gross negligence, prejudgment in-
terest, liability for independent contractors, and the law under the auto-
mobile guest statute.
A. Premises Liability
In Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.' the Texas Supreme Court
weakened the traditional common law entrant classification scheme for de-
termining landowner liability. 2 The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Hill,
however, relied upon a Dallas municipal ordinance and did not abolish the
traditional landowner classification scheme outright. 3 In Nixon an unknown
assailant abducted a ten year old girl and carried her to an abandoned apart-
ment where he raped her. The girl sued the owner of the vacant apartment
building for damages. The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the defendant owed no duty to the
plaintiff.4 The Dallas court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment,
* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., L.L.M., Southern Methodist University; At-
torney at Law, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas. The author acknowl-
edges the assistance of Michael A. Dover, a third-year law student at Southern Methodist
University, in the preparation of this article.
1. 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985).
2. Id. at 549-51. The common law developed three classes of entrants to land. The
landowner owes a different duty to members of each class. The landowner owes the least
stringent duty to a trespasser, which is defined as one who comes upon the land without the
possessor's permission or some other form of privilege. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 329 (1965). A landowner's only duty towards a trespasser is not to injure him willfully. 690
S.W.2d at 551 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). The second class of entrants is the licensee. While a
licensee enters the land with permission, he does so for his own purposes rather than for those
of the possessor. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 60 (4th ed. 1971). A
landowner owes a licensee a duty "not to injure him by willful, wanton or gross negligence."
State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1974). The licensor's knowledge of a hazardous
condition may raise a duty to warn the licensee or take action to make the condition reason-
ably safe if the licensee does not have knowledge of the danger. Id. A social guest is an
example of a licensee. W. PROSSER, supra § 60. The third class of entrants is that of the
invitee. An invitee is a person who enters the land on business that benefits or concerns the
landowner. Id. § 61. An occupier has a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees against
hazards and to maintain reasonably safe premises. J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Razey, 426 S.W.2d
538, 539 (Tex. 1968).
3. 690 S.W.2d at 547-51.
4. Id. at 548.
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holding that the plaintiff was a trespasser even though she did not enter the
premises voluntarily. 5
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The plurality opinion relied upon a
violation of a Dallas municipal ordinance to create a duty of the property
owner.6 The court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether the defendant breached its duty of care by violating the city
ordinance.
7
In addition, the court examined the issue of proximate cause and stated
that evidence existed to support the inference that the crime would not have
occurred had the building been properly secured.8 The court noted that the
assailant took the plaintiff directly to the vacant apartment, which indicated
that he knew that the apartment was a convenient place to complete the
assault.9
Addressing the issue of foreseeability, the court noted that the criminal
conduct of a third party is usually a superseding cause that relieves a negli-
gent person from liability.' 0 An exception exists, however, when the negli-
gent party realized or should have realized that a third party would take
advantage of such a dangerous situation." The court concluded that the
evidence of numerous violent crimes at the apartment complex raised a fact
issue concerning the forseeability of criminal activity.' 2
5. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 675 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984),
rev'd, 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985). The Dallas court indicated its unwillingness to extend the
duty of a property owner to a person who enters the owner's property without the owner's
knowledge or consent regardless of whether the person acted of his own volition. Id. at 587.
The court reasoned that the property owner could not be certain of the imposition of the duty
or the action reasonably necessary to discharge the duty. Id.
6. 690 S.W.2d at 548. Section 27-1 l(a)(6) of the Revised Code of Civil and Criminal
Ordinances of the City of Dallas states: (a) Property standards. An owner shall: ... (6) keep
the doors and windows of a vacant structure or vacant portion of a structure securely closed to
prevent unauthorized entry. Id.
7. The court stated:
The unexcused violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence as a
matter of law if such statute or ordinance was designed to prevent injury to the
class of persons to which the injured party belongs. A reasonable interpretation
of this ordinance is that it was designed to deter criminal activity by reducing
the conspicuous opportunities for criminal conduct. An ordinance requiring
apartment owners to do their part in deterring crime is designed to prevent in-
jury to the general public.
690 S.W.2d at 549.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 550.
11. Id. The court adopted the standard provided by § 448 of the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a super-
seding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negli-
gent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third
person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negli-
gent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation
might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity
to commit such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 448 (1965).
12. 690 S.W.2d at 550-51. See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436,
439-41 (1980) (court affirmed jury award of damages to assault victim based on evidence of
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Justice Kilgarlin, in a well-reasoned concurring opinion, urged the court
to abolish entirely the traditional entrant classification scheme and adopt "a
general duty of reasonable care under the circumstances." 1 3 Justice Kilgar-
lin stated that the entrant classification scheme is outdated and that courts
should not determine a landowner's liability based on the "visitor's artifi-
cially determined purpose of entry." 1 4 Justice Kilgarlin used the facts of the
Nixon case to demonstrate the potentially absurd results of the antiquated
classification system. 15 Because her assailant dragged the plaintiff across the
street into the vacant apartment, she was technically a trespasser, while if
she had lived in the apartments and her attacker had assaulted her in a com-
mon area, she would be either an invitee or a licensee.' 6
Justice Kilgarlin noted that fifteen states have rejected the common law
approach.' 7 He perceives a trend toward abolishing the common law classi-
fication scheme as a result of the decreased importance of land ownership in
our society.' 8 In conclusion, Justice Kilgarlin asserted that Texas should
abolish the entrant classifications in premise liability since society's concern
for human safety outweighs the historical purpose of the classifications, the
prestige of property ownership.' 9
Justice McGee wrote a dissenting opinion 20 in which he argued that the
defendant could not have reasonably foreseen the criminal conduct of the
unknown assailant as a matter of law. 2 1 Justice McGee also argued that the
high crime rate in neighborhood and reasonable foreseeability that landlord's failure to install
a lock on front entrance would lead to this type of assault).
13. 690 S.W.2d at 551 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). Justice Kilgarlin argued that such a
duty would not extend to a trespasser who enters intending to commit a crime. Id. at 554.
14. Id. at 552.
15. Id. at 551-52.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 552. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 152 U.S. App. D.C. 86, 469 F.2d 97,
105, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Webb v. City of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 732-33 (Alaska
1977); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101-02
(1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308, 314 (1971); Wood v.
Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973); Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d
445, 446 (1969); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 370 (La.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 833 (1976); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 849-50 (Me. 1979); Mounsey v.
Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199
N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972); Quellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (1976);
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 242, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (1976);
O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d
836, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1975).
18. 690 S.W.2d at 553 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 554. Justice Spears separately concurred. He argued that liability should not be
premised entirely upon the ordinance and that the court should adopt a new exception to the
traditional classification scheme. Justice Spears, however, was unwilling to abolish completely
the classification system, arguing that the categories of entrants aid juries in imposing liability
consistent with the social policies underlying the classification scheme. Id. at 554. (Spears, J.,
concurring).
20. Justices Wallace and Gonzales joined the dissent.
21. 690 S.W.2d at 560 (McGee, J., dissenting). Justice McGee challenged the plurality's
finding concerning previous occurrences of violent crime at the apartment complex. Justice
McGee argued that the record indicated that only non-violent property crimes occurred fol-
lowing the purchase of the apartments by the defendant. He concluded that the defendant
could not have reasonably foreseen a violent crime occurring as a result of his failure to lock
the door of the vacant apartment. Id. at 557-59.
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unlocked door on the vacant apartment was not the cause in fact of the
plaintiff's rape because it could not be established that, but for the unlocked
door, the crime would not have happened. 22
B. Exemplary Damages
In Dyson v. Olin Corp.23 the Texas Supreme Court elaborated upon the
definition of gross negligence enunciated in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls.24 In
Dyson the supreme court focused on the mental attitude of the defendant. 25
The court rejected the court of appeals' "new and independent examination"
of the peril created and focused solely on whether the acts or omissions of
the defendant displayed the requisite disregard for others.26 In a well-rea-
soned and enlightened concurring opinion, Justice Robertson questioned the
current practice of allowing the courts of appeals to weigh all of the evidence
in determining if the jury verdict is against the great weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence. 27 Justice Robertson argued that appellate review of the
factual sufficiency of evidence infringes upon the right to trial by jury. 28 Jus-
tice Robertson urged the supreme court to earnestly consider whether the
court of appeals, in exercising its factual sufficiency review, is undermining
the right to trial by jury. 29
In Williams v. Steves Industries, Inc. 30 the Austin court of appeals held
22. Id. at 556. Justice McGee cited the "but for" test for determining cause in fact as
adopted by the court in Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. 1970).
23. 692 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1985).
24. Id. at 458-59; Burk, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981). The Burk Royalty court defined
gross negligence as follows:
The essence of gross negligence is not the neglect which must, of course, exist.
What lifts ordinary negligence into gross negligence is the mental attitude of the
defendant; that is what justifies the penal nature of the imposition of exemplary
damages. The plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously, i.e.,
knowingly, indifferent to his rights, welfare and safety. In other words, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or
omissions demonstrated that he didn't care. Such conduct can be active or pas-
sive in nature.
Id. at 922.
25. 692 S.W.2d at 457-58. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals re-
quirements that the plaintiff prove: (1) that the defendant knew of the existence of an unrea-
sonable peril, and (2) that the defendant's acts or omissions demonstrated that he was
indifferent to the safety of the plaintiff. 678 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1984), revd, 692 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1985).
26. 692 S.W.2d at 458.
27. 692 S.W.2d at 458 (Robertson, J., concurring). The court of appeals currently review
the factual sufficiency of the evidence under the standard enunciated in In re King's Estate, 10
Tex. 662, 664-65, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). In King's Estate, the court interpreted article
V, § 6 of the Texas Constitution as giving the courts of appeals the right to review the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661. See TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 6 (decisions of courts of appeals are conclusive on all issues of fact brought
before the court).
28. 692 S.W.2d at 458-59. The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by article I, § 15 of the
Texas Constitution.
29. 692 S.W.2d at 459. Justice Robertson concurred in Dyson because neither party
raised the issue of the court of appeals' authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence. Id.




that punitive damages are not available for the mere violation of a statute.3'
To support a punitive damage award, the violation must not only "be unlaw-
ful but also of a wanton and malicious nature."' 32 The court held that when
the only act constituting "heedless and reckless disregard for the rights of
others" consisted of the defendant's permitting a person to drive his vehicle
without a commercial driver's license, this was not sufficient to justify puni-
tive damages as a matter of law.33
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed.34 The court held that the evidence
was inadequate to support a finding of gross negligence based upon negligent
entrustment when the lack of a drivers' license is the only alleged grossly
negligent omission.35 In reaching its decision, the court emphasized the lim-
ited usefulness of drivers' licenses in determining the competence of a
driver.36 Thus, the court concluded that the risk taken by the defendant in
permitting a person to drive unlicensed was unreasonable, but not severe
enough to allow a jury to find that the defendant did not care whether the
driver harmed someone. 37
Two cases decided during the Survey period compared the defendant's
gross negligence with the plaintiff's negligence. In Anderson v. Trent 38 the
Dallas court of appeals refused to reduce an exemplary damage award by the
percentage of the plaintiff's negligence. 39 The defendant argued that the
court should reduce the exemplary damage award by the percentage of the
plaintiff's contributory negligence, relying upon Pedernales Electric Cooper-
ative, Inc. v. Schultz.4° The Dallas court declined to follow Pedernales,
stressing that the paramount purpose for awarding exemplary damages is to
punish the defendant and not to compensate the plaintiff.4' Additionally, the
court noted that Texas law has traditionally considered gross negligence to
be distinct from ordinary negligence. 42 Because gross negligence and ordi-
nary negligence are fundamentally different, the Dallas court found the com-
31. Id. at 211.
32. Id.
33. Id. Justice Brady dissented, arguing that the fact that the defendant continued to
permit his driver to drive without a license after the accident constituted a reckless disregard
for the rights of others. Id. at 213 (Brady, J., dissenting).
34. Williams v. Steves Indus. Inc., 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 53, 55 (Nov. 13, 1985).
35. Id. The Williams court cited with approval Webster v. Carson, 609 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ), agreeing that in order to support a gross
negligence finding, the plaintiff must produce evidence of additional aggravating circumstances
that show the extreme danger associated with entrustment. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 55.
36. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 55. The court noted that a number of reasons other than incom-
petence explain why a person might not have a driver's license, such as a careless failure to
renew the license. Id.
37. Id. The court also noted that although the defendant permitted the driver to drive
another eight or nine months without a license, no evidence existed that the defendant knew
the driver to be an incompetent or dangerous driver. Id. at 56.
38. 685 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Id. at 713-14.
40. 583 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. 685 S.W.2d at 714.




parison of the two improper for purposes of reducing compensation. 43
The Dallas court of appeals later issued its opinion in Jannette v. Deprez.44
In Janette the plaintiff was injured in a diving accident at an abandoned,
water-filled quarry on the defendant's property. The jury found that the
plaintiff was a trespasser and that the defendant was grossly negligent. 45
Based upon the jury's findings, the trial court rendered a take nothing judg-
ment in favor of the defendant.46
The court of appeals held that under the Texas Comparative Negligence
Statute47 a plaintiff's ordinary negligence may be compared with a defend-
ant's gross negligence in determining whether the court should reduce or bar
the plaintiff's claim for actual damages.4 8 The court noted that under Texas
law prior to the passage of the comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff's
-contributory negligence completely barred recovery, regardless of the de-
fendant's gross negligence. 49 Additionally, the court stated that the enact-
ment of Article 2212a5O only served to abolish contributory negligence as a
complete bar to recovery when the jury finds that the plaintiff was negligent
to a lesser degree than the defendant. 51 The court found no evidence of an
intent by the legislature to eliminate consideration of plaintiff's negligence
when the jury finds the plaintiff to be more negligent than the defendant.5 2
The court asserted that the prior law of contributory negligence controls
except as preempted by the comparative negligence statute.53
The court distinguished Anderson, stating that Anderson did not address
the issue presented in Jannette: whether the plaintiff's negligence bars or
reduces the plaintiff's recovery of actual damages when the defendant is
guilty of gross negligence. 54 Additionally, the court declined to extend the
pure comparative causation scheme of Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.55 to
cases in which the defendant is guilty of gross negligence.5 6
43. 685 S.W.2d at 714.
44. 701 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
45. Id. The jury found that the plaintiff's injuries resulted 65% from her own negligence
and 35% from the defendant's negligence. Id.
46. Id., slip op. at 2.
47. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.001-33.017 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
48. Jannette, 701 S.W.2d at 58.
49. Id. See, e.g., Parrott v. Garcia, 436 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. 1969); Sargent v. Williams,
152 Tex. 413, 416-17, 258 S.W.2d 787, 789 (1953); Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 126, 246
S.W.2d 607, 610 (1952).
50. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1985) (now found in TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.001-33.017 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).




55. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (allowing defendants in certain non-negligence actions to
obtain jury allocation of damages based on the plaintiff's, defendant's and third parties' respec-
tive percentages of causation as determined by the jury).
56. Jannette, 701 S.W.2d at 59-60. The court refused to extend Duncan's pure compara-
tive causation scheme for cases in which at least one defendant is liable on a theory "other than
negligence" to cases in which a defendant is liable for gross negligence. Id. at 60. The court
noted that gross negligence does not contain the element of intentional conduct required for




In the landmark case of Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.57 the
Texas Supreme Court authorized the recovery of prejudgment interest in
some instances by successful plaintiffs in personal injury cases.58 The court
followed Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co.59 and held that pre-
judgment interest is recoverable upon general equitable principles.6° The
court reasoned that an award of damages does not fully compensate a suc-
cessful plaintiff in the absence of prejudgment interest because it does not
reflect the plaintiff's lost opportunity to invest and earn interest on the
amount of damages during the time of the occurrence and the time of the
judgment.61 The court stated that its holding would remove existing incen-
tives for defendants to delay and thereby serve to expedite both settlements
and trials. 62
In reaching its decision, the court rejected dicta from Watkins v. Junker63
to the extent that it prohibited recovery of prejudgment interest in personal
injury cases. 64 The Watkins court justified its rejection of recovery of pre-
judgment interest in personal injury cases on the grounds that the measure
of damages was not fixed at any particular time.65 The court in Cavnar,
however, noted that prejudgment interest has commonly been awarded in
other cases involving unliquidated damages66 and that no more uncertainty
exists in a personal injury action than in other cases allowing prejudgment
interest. 67 The court held that successful plaintiffs are entitled to prejudg-
ment interest at the legal rate on damages that have accrued by the date of
judgment.68
D. Independent Contractors
The Texas Supreme Court took a traditional approach in Redinger v. Liv-
ing, Inc.69 by adopting the Restatement of Torts position 70 that a general
57. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
58. Id. at 552.
59. 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1978) (recognizing equity of compensating a claimant for pre-
judgment interest).
60. Id. at 485..
61. 696 S.W.2d at 552.
62. Id. at 554. The court noted that by awarding prejudgment interest at proximate mar-
ket rates, the court does not create an incentive for the plaintiff to delay either. Id.
63. 90 Tex. 584, 587, 40 S.W. 11, 12 (1897).
64. 696 S.W.2d at 554.
65. 90 Tex. at 587, 40 S.W. at 12.
66. 696 S.W.2d at 553.
67. Id.
68. Id. In wrongful death and non-death personal injury cases, the court held that inter-
est would begin to accrue six months after the date of the occurrence giving rise to the cause of
action. Id. at 554. In survival actions, interest begins to accrue from the date of the decedent's
death. Id. The interest rate is to be determined according to the provisions of TEX. REv. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 2 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986). Additionally, the court held that
plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest for punitive damages and future damages.
696 S.W.2d at 554-55. Moreover, if the plaintiffs fail to segregate their past and future dam-
ages, they are not entitled to prejudgment interest on any of their damages. Id. at 555.
69. 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985).
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contractor may be directly liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in
supervising independent subcontractors. Living, Inc. was the general con-
tractor on a building construction site. Redinger was an employee of the
plumbing subcontractor. Living's superintendent ordered Baird, the dirt
hauling subcontractor, to remove some dirt while Redinger was working a
few feet away. During the course of moving the dirt, the tractor crushed
Redinger's left index finger. The jury found Living fifty percent negligent for
permitting Baird to move the dirt while Redinger worked in the area.71 The
court of appeals reversed the judgment due to jury misconduct; the Texas
Supreme Court reversed. 72
The supreme court noted that an owner, occupier, or general contractor
ordinarily does not have a duty to ensure that an independent contractor
performs his work in a safe manner.73 The general contractor, however,
may be held to a reasonable care standard if he exercises some control over
the subcontractor's work.74 The court thus adopted the rule stated in sec-
tion 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.75
The Restatement rule applies when the employer retains some control
over the independent contractor's work, but not enough control to create a
borrowed servant relationship. 76 Additionally, the employer must retain
more control than simply ordering the work schedule, inspecting progress,
or receiving reports. 77 In Redinger the court found that Living had retained
the right to control the sequence in which the independent contractor per-
formed the work, and the right to prohibit work from being done in a dan-
gerous manner.78 The court held that Living had exercised a degree of
control sufficient to impose a duty upon Living to exercise its supervisory
powers with reasonable care.79
In Jones v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp.80 the plaintiff was injured by
the negligent act of an independent contractor who delivered newspapers for
the defendant. The plaintiff presented evidence at trial indicating that the
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
71. Living, Inc. v. Redinger, 667 S.W.2d 846, 853-55 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984), rev'd, 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1985).
72. 689 S.W.2d at 418. On a construction site, a general contractor is charged with the
same duty as an owner or occupier to use reasonable care to keep the construction site in a safe
condition. Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 464, 226 S.W.2d 425, 431 (1950).
73. 689 S.W.2d at 418.
74. Id.
75. Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the con-
trol of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for
whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is
caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) (emphasis added).
76. 689 S.W.2d at 418.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. When an occupier merely visited the site to inspect the work and receive reports,
the occupier had not exercised a sufficient degree of control to owe a duty toward the contrac-
tor. Bryant v. Gulf Oil Corp., 694 S.W.2d 443, 448 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ
requested).
80. 694 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
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defendant was aware of the independent contractor's practice of driving on
the wrong side of the street when delivering newspapers. The Amarillo
court of appeals reversed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
holding that a defendant may be liable when he knowingly employs a negli-
gent independent contractor.8 1
E. Guest Statute
The supreme court declared the Texas Automobile Guest Statute8 2 uncon-
stitutional in Whitworth v. Bynum.83 Whitworth sustained injuries in an au-
tomobile accident while riding in Bynum's car. Whitworth sued Bynum,
and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bynum on the
basis that the guest statute barred Whitworth's claim. The court of appeals
affirmed the summary judgment and upheld the constitutionality of the guest
statute, relying upon Tisko v. Harrison . 4
The supreme court reversed and held that the guest statute was unconsti-
tutional under the Texas equal protection clause.8 5  The court concluded
that the guest statute bears no rational relationship to its purpose and creates
an irrebuttable presumption that all automobile passengers within the sec-
ond degree of affinity or consanguinity to the driver act collusively in bring-
ing suit against the driver.8 6 The only dissenters were Chief Justice Hill and
Justice McGee, who argued that the prevention of collusive lawsuits was a
proper purpose for the statute and that the classifications created by the
guest statute were rationally related to the purpose of preventing collusive
lawsuits.8 7
F. Texas Tort Claims Act
In City of Denton v. Page88 the Fort Worth court of appeals held the city
81. Id. at 458.
82. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701 (Vernon 1977). The Texas Guest Statute is
now found in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 72.001 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) as follows:
A person who is related to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity and who is being transported in the
motor vehicle over a public highway of this state as a guest without payment for
the transportation has a cause of action against the owner or operator of the
motor vehicle for injury, death, or loss in an accident only if the accident was
intentional on the part of said owner or operator or was caused by his heedless-
ness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.
83. 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985).
84. Whitworth v. Bynum, 679 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984),
rev'd, 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985); see Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (constitutionality of the guest statute upheld against an equal
protection challenge).
85. 699 S.W.2d at 197. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3. Article I, § 3 provides: "All free men,
when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to
separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Id.
86. 699 S.W.2d at 196.
87. Id. at 198 (Hill, C.J., dissenting). Although Chief Justice Hill asserted that the guest
statute should stand under deferential scrutiny, he concluded by noting that he would vote for
the repeal of the guest statute if he were a member of the legislature. Id.
88. 683 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985), rev'd, 701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986).
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liable for damages to the plaintiff resulting from a fire in a barn.8 9 The plain-
tiff in City of Denton leased a house from Melton. A barn was on the prop-
erty; however, the lease did not include the barn as part of the rental
property. After several suspicious fires, the City Fire Marshall inspected the
barn, but failed to find two cans of gasoline stored there. The undetected
gasoline exploded causing injury to the plaintiff. In his petition the plaintiff
alleged that the City of Denton was negligent in failing to remove the gaso-
line cans from the barn, failing to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condi-
tion, failing to ensure that the barn was secured against intruders, and failing
to discover the gasoline upon inspection of the barn. The City of Denton
argued that it could not be held liable on the basis of premises liability be-
cause it was neither an owner nor an occupier of the property. In affirming
the trial court's judgment against the City of Denton, the court of appeals
began by stating that this case was not a premises defect case.90 Instead, the
court found the City of Denton liable under the Tort Claims Act9' for inju-
ries suffered as a result of the unsafe condition of the property.92
The court found that the City of Denton was negligent in causing a dan-
gerous condition of property that contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. 93
The court stated that since the city's negligence in failing to remedy the
dangerous condition contributed to plaintiff's injuries, the city could be held
statutorily liable if the court could find a private person liable.94 Further,
the court held that when a party satisfactorily pleads a cause of action based
on some "condition" 95 of real property, governmental liability may exist to
the extent that private liability would exist, despite the fact that the govern-
ment unit neither owns, occupies, nor furnishes the property. 96  The
supreme court has granted writ of error and has heard oral arguments on the
Page case.
97
89. Id. at 188.
90. Id.
91. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section 3 pro-
vides in part:
Each unit of government in the state shall be liable for money damages for...
death or personal injuries so caused from some condition or use of tangible
property, real or personal, under circumstances where such unit of government,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
this State.
Id. (now found in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021.(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (in
substantially similar language).
92. 683 S.W.2d at 188-89.
93. Id. at 189-90.
94. Id. at 190.
95. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
96. 683 S.W.2d at 188-89.
97. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that because section 3 of the Texas Tort
Claims Act does not create new duties of care and because the City of Denton was not in
control of the premises, the City of Denton did not owe a duty of reasonable care to Page. City




In Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin9 8 the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether an employer who intentionally maintains an unsafe workplace may
be found to have intentionally injured an employee. The court began its
analysis by noting that the difference between negligent injury and inten-
tional injury is "the specific intent to inflict injury." 99 The court noted that
the weight of authority in most jurisdictions is that the concept of intentional
injury does not include "gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, intentional, reck-
less, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other miscon-
duct short of genuine intentional injury."' ' ° Additionally, the court noted
that other state courts have held that the following activities do not consti-
tute intentional injury sufficient to escape the liability limitations of worker's
compensation systems: (1) intentional failure to provide a safe workplace;
(2) intentional modification or removal of safety guards; (3) intentional vio-
lation of safety regulation; (4) intentional failure to train an employee to
perform a dangerous job; and (5) requiring an employee to work long
hours.' 0 The court concluded that unless an employer believes that his in-
tentional failure to furnish a safe place to work will certainly cause injury,
the employer's action does not rise to the level of intentional injury. 10 2
Thus, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of the employer. 10 3
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. Statutes of Limitations
A number of cases have arisen during the Survey period concerning the
constitutionality of the two-year statute of limitations contained in the Medi-
cal Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (hereinafter cited as "Article
4590i" or the "Act"). 104 In Nelson v. Krusen 105 the Texas Supreme Court
98. 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985).
99. Id. at 406. The Restatement defines "intent" as follows: "the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
100. 689 S.W.2d at 406 (citing 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION
§ 68-13 (1983)).
101. 689 S.W.2d at 406-07.
102. 689 S.W.2d at 407.
103. 689 S.W.2d at 408.
104. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 10.01
provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be com-
menced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the
breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the
subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is com-
pleted; provided that, minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their
14th birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim. Except as
herein provided, this subchapter applies to all persons regardless of minority or
other legal disability.
Id.
105. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
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declared the two-year statute of limitations contained in article 4590i uncon-
stitutional to the extent that it barred a plaintiff's cause of action before the
plaintiff could reasonably have discovered his injury. 106 In holding the stat-
ute of limitations unconstitutional, the court relied upon the open courts
provision of the Texas Constitution. 10 7 The court also recalled its holding in
Sax v. Votteler,10 8 in which the court stated that "the right to bring a well-
established common law cause of action cannot be effectively abrogated by
the legislature absent a showing that the legislative basis for the statute out-
weighs the denial of the constitutionally-guaranteed right to redress."' 10 9
Applying the Sax test, the court in Nelson stated that it would be unrea-
sonable to expect a plaintiff to sue before he knew or had reason to know of
his injury.110 The court reasoned that application of the two-year statute of
limitations would require the impossible from the plaintiffs. I1  The court
described such a result as "shocking" and "absurd" and declared the statute
unconstitutional. ' 1 2
In Neagle v. Nelson 13 the supreme court also held the two-year statute of
limitations contained in article 4590i unconstitutional to the extent that it
barred a person's claim before he reasonably could have discovered his in-
jury.11 4 In Neagle the plaintiff underwent an appendectomy in December
1977. During the operation, the doctor left a surgical sponge in the plain-
tiff's abdomen. Surgeons discovered the sponge in January 1980 when the
plaintiff submitted to exploratory surgery after feeling a mass in his abdo-
men. The trial court granted summary judgment based upon the two-year
statute of limitations."l 5  The court of appeals affirmed."l 6 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, reasoning that if the plain-
tiff's allegations were true, he could not have discovered his injury before the
statute of limitations had run.' 17
The supreme court's majority opinions in Nelson and Neagle left un-
resolved the question of how courts should apply the statute of limitations
contained in article 4590i when the plaintiff has discovered his injury within
the two-year period." 8 The well-reasoned concurring opinions of Justice
Robertson and Justice Kilgarlin addressed this question. 119 Justice Kilgar-
106. 678 S.W.2d at 919.
107. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
108. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
109. Id. at 665-66. Additionally, in Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967), the
Texas Supreme Court recognized the discovery rule. Under the Gaddis rule, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the patient discovered or reasonably should have discov-
ered his injury. Id. at 580.
110. 678 S.W.2d at 923.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id.; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
116. 658 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
117. 685 S.W.2d at 12.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 12-15.
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lin stated that the legislature intended to abolish the discovery rule of Gaddis
v. Smith 120 when it enacted article 4590i. 121 Justice Kilgarlin urged that the
court adopt a rule similar to that stated in Hawkins v. Safety Casualty Co.'22
Under the Hawkins rule, the statute will not bar a late filing worker's com-
pensation claimant if he can show good cause for filing late. 123 A claimant is
not barred if he has prosecuted his claim with the degree of diligence that an
ordinary person would exercise under similar circumstances. 124
Justice Robertson disagreed with Justice Kilgarlin's conclusion that arti-
cle 4590i abolished the discovery rule. 125 Justice Robertson suggested that
the court return to the discovery rule and hold that the two-year limitations
period should begin to run from the date of discovery since the statute of
limitations then would not be unconstitutional as applied. 126
In Morrison v. Chan 127 the Texas Supreme Court held that article 4590i
abolished the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases. 128 In Morrison
the plaintiff received radiation treatments for cervical cancer from the de-
fendant. The defendant completed the final radiation treatment on February
13, 1980. In September 1980, the plaintiff discovered a hole between her
bladder and vagina. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant on October
6, 1982, two years and eight months after the last treatment. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant based upon section 10.01 of
article 4590i. 129
In upholding the constitutionality of the two-year statute of limitations,
the majority distinguished Nelson v. Krusen 130 and Neagle v. Nelson. 13' The
court noted the impossibility in both Nelson and Neagle for the plaintiff to
have discovered his injury before the statute of limitations had run.132 In
Morrison the plaintiff discovered her injury within the two-year period; thus,
the plaintiff could have filed her suit within the specified time. 133
The court then examined the proper construction to give to the Act. The
court noted that it must, to the extent possible, construe statutes as written
and ascertain legislative intent from the writing itself.134 Based upon the
language of section 10.01 of article 4590i, the court concluded that the legis-
lature intended to abolish the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases
120. 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
121. 685 S.W.2d at 14 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
122. 146 Tex. 381, 384, 207 S.W.2d 370, 372 (1948).
123. 685 S.W.2d at 14 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 12 (Robertson, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 13.
127. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 29 (Oct. 29, 1985).
128. Id. at 31.
129. Id.; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
130. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
131. 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
132. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 30. See supra text accompanying notes 105-17 for a discussion
of the Nelson and Neagle cases.
133. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 30.
134. Id. at 31.
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covered by the Act.' 35 The court barred plaintiff's recovery based on her
failure to file suit within the eighteen months between discovery of her injury
and the two-year statutory limitation period.
136
B. Statutory Limitation on Damages
In response to pressures from the insurance industry and the Texas Medi-
cal Association, the Texas Legislature, in the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act of 1977, imposed a $500,000 limitation on the civil
liability of physicians or health care providers. 137 In Detar Hospital, Inc. v.
Estrada138 the Corpus Christi court of appeals declared unconstitutional
that portion of the Act limiting the amount of damages that a patient may
recover in a medical malpractice action. 139 In Estrada the plaintiff asserted
that the liability limitations of sections 11.01-11.05 of article 4590i' 40 violate
the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. '4'
135. Id.
136. Id. A plaintiff must file suit within two years and seventy-five days of his last treat-
ment unless the plaintiff's injury could not reasonably be discovered within the limitations
period. Desemo v. Gafford, 692 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Moreover, the doctor's temporary absence from the state does not toll the statute of
limitations. Hill v. Milani, 686 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex. 1985).
137. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
138. 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ requested).
139. Id. at 365-66.
140. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.01-11.05 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Sections
11.02-11.03 of article § 4590i provide:
Sec. 11.02
(a) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment is ren-
dered against a physician or health care provider, the limit of civil liability for
damages of the physician or health care provider shall be limited to an amount
not to exceed $500,000.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to the amount of damages
awarded on a health care liability claim for the expenses of necessary medical,
hospital, and custodial care received before judgment or required in the future
for treatment of the injury.
(c) This section shall not limit the liability of any insurer where facts exist that
would enable a party to invoke the common law theory of recovery commonly
known in Texas as the "Stowers Doctrine."
(d) In any action on a health care liability claim that is tried by a jury in any
court in this state, the following shall be included in the court's written instruc-
tion to the jurors: Do not consider, discuss, nor speculate whether or not liabil-
ity, if any, on the part of any party is or is not subject to any limit under
applicable law.
Sec. 11.03.
In the event that Section 11.02(a) of this subchapter is stricken from this sub-
chapter or is otherwise invalidated by a method other than through legislative
means, the following shall become effective: In an action on a health care liabil-
ity claim where final judgment is rendered against a physician or health care
provider, the limit of civil liability of a physician or health care provider for all
past and future noneconomic losses recoverable by or on behalf of any injured
person and/or the estate of such person, including without limitations as appli-
cable past and future physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and suffering,
consortium, disfigurement, and any other nonpecuniary damage, shall be limited
to an amount not to exceed $150,000.
Id. §§ 11.02-11.03.
141. 694 S.W.2d at 365.
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The court began its equal protection analysis by noting that since this case
involved neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right,142 the court
should apply the "rational basis" standard of review.' 43 Under the rational
basis standard, the court must determine whether the legislative purpose for
implementing the limitation on recovery outweighs the tort litigant's right to
redress. 44 The court found that the stated purpose of the liability limitation
was to deter unmeritorious suits and to promote the availability of health
care. 145 In holding that the liability limitations are not rationally related to
the statute's stated purpose, the court asserted that the statute not only did
not limit non-meritorious claims but that the availability of health care re-
sulting from the encouragement of physicians to practice came at the ex-
pense of those claimants with meritorious claims. 146 Estrada presents the
Texas Supreme Court, which in recent years has gained national recognition
for its progressive attitudes, with an opportunity to consider the constitu-
tionality of the liability limitation provisions of the Act.
147
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Martin v. Petta 148 the plaintiff suffered a broken toe while hospitalized
for a hemorrhoid operation. The plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, arguing that her injury was of such a character that it would not
ordinarily occur without negligence and that the defendant had complete
control of the instrumentality causing the injury. The defendant argued that
res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in medical malpractice cases.
The court of appeals accepted the defendant's argument that res ipsa lo-
quitur does not apply in medical malpractice cases. 149 Section 7.01 of article
4590i specifically limits the use of res ipsa loquitur to those cases to which it
had been applied as of the effective date of the Act. 15 0 The court stated that
because Texas courts limited the use of res ipsa loquitur to cases in which
the "alleged malpractice and injuries are plainly within the common knowl-
edge of laymen" before the effective date of the Act, res ipsa loquitur was not
142. Id.; see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Supreme Court held state statute
to a stricter standard of review since the classification touched on a fundamental right).
143. 694 S.W.2d at 365.
144. 694 S.W.2d at 365; see also Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983).
145. 694 S.W.2d at 365; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
146. 694 S.W.2d at 366 (quoting Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978)). Addi-
tionally, in Malone and Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrect, 685 S.W.2d 739, 753 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, no writ), the court declared the liability limitation provisions of § 11.02 unconstitutional
as applied to a corporation operating as a pharmacy.
147. The Texas Supreme Court has also granted writ in Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas,
Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ granted), in which the
Beaumont court of appeals declared § 11.02 unconstitutional. See Powers, Personal Torts, An-
nual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 93, 111-12 (1985).
148. 694 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
149. Id. at 239.
150. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 7.01 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 7.01
provides as follows: "The common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur shall only apply to health
care liability claims against health care providers or physicians in those cases to which it has
been applied by the appellate courts of this state as of the effective date of the subchapter." Id.
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applicable in this case.1 51
Justice Ashworth dissented, 152 arguing that under the circumstances of
this case, res ipsa loquitur should apply. 153 Justice Ashworth found compel-
ling the fact that plaintiff placed herself under the complete control of the
doctor and sustained a broken toe while unconscious. Justice Ashworth as-
serted that a fact issue existed as to whether the doctor's negligence caused
plaintiff's injury and that the fact finder should resolve this issue. 154 Conse-
quently, Justice Ashworth would have reversed the summary judgment in
favor of the defendant and remanded the case for a trial on the merits. 155
D. Miscellaneous
In Dennis v. Allison 156 the Texas Supreme Court refused to hold a psychi-
atrist liable for breach of implied warranty to comply with the ethical stan-
dards of the psychiatric profession.' 5 7 In Dennis the plaintiff was a long
time patient of the defendant. The plaintiff flew to Dallas to consult with the
defendant. While in Dallas, the defendant allegedly physically beat and sex-
ually assaulted the plaintiff in her hotel room.
In rejecting the plaintiff's implied warranty claim, the supreme court
noted that implied warranty theories arose as a means to make a seller an
insurer for the safety of the product that he sold. 158 Moreover, the adoption
of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A 159 and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's implied warranties' 60 has led the supreme court to hold that
"the protection of Texas consumers no longer requires the utilization of an
implied warranty as a matter of public policy.' 161 The court noted that a
cause of action for medical malpractice or assault and battery provides a
patient with an adequate remedy in a case in which a physician sexually
assaults the patient. 162
Justice Ray dissented, arguing that the supreme court should extend the
151. 694 S.W.2d at 239; see, e.g., Williford v. Banowsky, 563 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Irick v. Andrew, 545 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rayner v. John Buist Chester Hosp., 526
S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




156. 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985).
157. Id. at 94-96.
158. Id. at 94-95. Texas originally adopted the implied warranty theory in Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829-31 (1942), a food contamina-
tion case. The Decker court adopted the implied warranty theory because of problems of proof
inherent in a contract or tort cause of action for contaminated food. Id. at 834. In McKisson
v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967), the court extended the implied warranty
theory to defective products that cause physical harm to persons. Id. at 789.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
160. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1977).
161. 698 S.W.2d at 95 (quoting Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77,
78 (Tex. 1977)).
162. 698 S.W.2d at 95-96; see Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627,
629 (1980); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589-90 (App. Div. 1976); see
also Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968) (court rejected a claim against an
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implied warranty theory to professional services. 163 Justice Ray noted that
in a pure service case, the statutory implied warranties of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code are not available. 164 Justice Ray would extend the implied
warranty concept so that a "professional service provider, at a minimum,
impliedly warrants that he will not breach the ethical commandments of his
calling in providing his service."' 165
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Survey period did not produce any landmark developments in Texas
products liability law. Texas courts decided, however, a number of notewor-
thy cases during the Survey period. These cases refine concepts shaped by
recent major developments while raising additional questions for resolution.
A. Defect
During the Survey period plaintiffs continued their attempt to expand the
concept of strict liability to achieve social policy goals which they claim the
state legislatures and congress have failed to achieve. The two prominent
targets of this attack have been handguns and cigarettes. There was one
pertinent federal case reported during the period addressing the issue of
whether a handgun is a defective product.
In Patterson v. Gesellschaft 166 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas held that a properly functioning handgun is not a
defective product and granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. 167 In Patterson armed robbers shot a convenience store clerk to death.
His mother brought suit against the manufacturer of the handgun, alleging a
defective design and a defective distribution system that made it too easy for
criminals to obtain handguns.' 68
optometrist for breach of warranty in selling and fitting contact lenses because the contact
lenses were not sold to the general public as an end product through regular channels of trade).
163. 698 S.W.2d at 96-97 (Ray, J., dissenting). Justices Kilgarlin and Spears joined Justice
Ray in dissent.
164. Id. at 96. Justice Ray would overrule Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977), to the extent that it eliminates the public policy rationale for the im-
plied warranty theory in non-sale of goods transactions. 698 S.W.2d at 96.
165. 698 S.W.2d at 97. Justice Ray also stated that Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342
(Tex. 1968) should be overruled to the extent it disallows a cause of action against a profes-
sional for breach of an implied warranty to abide by the ethical standards of the profession.
698 S.W.2d at 97.
166. 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
167. Id. at 1208. The court stated:
This claim is totally without merit and totally unsupported by legal precedent.
It is a misuse of tort law, a baseless and tortured extension of products liability
principles. And, it is an obvious attempt, unwise and unwarranted, even if un-
derstandable-to ban or restrict handguns through courts and juries, despite the
repeated refusals of state legislatures and Congress to pass strong, comprehen-
sive gun-control measures.
Id. (emphasis in original).
168. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer defectively designed the handgun be-
cause the risks for danger outweighed the social utility. In addition, the plaintiff alleged a
defect in the manufacturer's distribution system based on the ability of criminals to obtain
handguns and misuse them. Id.
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In Patterson the plaintiff admitted that the handgun did not malfunction.
The plaintiff argued that if the handgun was unreasonably dangerous, the
court could find the handgun to be defectively designed. 169 The plaintiff
contended that Texas law does not require proof of a defect and that the jury
should be allowed to apply the risk-utility test to any product. 170 In rejecting
this argument, the court stated that under Texas law, the product must have
a defect before the court will apply the risk-utility test and allow recovery. 171
In this case, the court concluded that the gun was not defective because it
functioned as it was intended to function. 172
The Patterson court noted that the plaintiff's theory was inconsistent with
the risk-utility test because that test includes weighing the cost and practical-
ity of a remedial design.' 73 The court pointed out that the plaintiff offered
no safer designs for handguns, nor would plaintiffs be able to do so because
of the inherent dangerousness of a gun.' 74 The court concluded that the
plaintiff employed her argument in an attempt to eliminate handguns by use
of the judicial system. 17 Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiff's dis-
tribution defect claim by recognizing that no such concept exists under
169. Id. at 1210. Additionally, the plaintiff admitted that the handgun possessed all essen-
tial safety features. Id.
170. Id. The plaintiff argued that the jury should determine whether the risks of death or
injury outweigh the benefits of handguns. In arguing that the risks outweigh any utility from
handguns, the plaintiff stated:
Handgun use results in 22,000 deaths every year in the United States and that
medical care for gunshot victims costs approximately $500 million each year.
Although handguns constitute only thirty percent of all firearms sold in the
United States, ninety percent of all cases of firearm misuse involve handguns.
Most murders are sudden crimes of passion; without the ready availability of
handguns, such crimes would be less likely. Proponents of manufacturers' lia-
bility further agree that handguns are almost useless for self-protection: a hand-
gun is six times more likely to be used to kill a friend or relative than to repel a
burglar, and a person who uses a handgun in self-defense is eight times more
likely to be killed than one who quietly acquiesces. Thus, handguns, at least as
distributed to the general public, are said to be defective.
Id. at 1210 (quoting Note, Handguns and Product Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1914
(1984)); see also Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N.
Ky. L. REV. 41 (1982).
171. 608 F. Supp. at 1211; see Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex.
1979) (in design defect cases, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective, that the
defect made the product unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect was a producing cause of
the plaintiff's injuries).
172. 608 F. Supp. at 1211; see Hulsebosch v. Ramsey, 435 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ) (a rifle is not defective when it operates as it is
intended to operate).
173. 608 F. Supp. at 1212.
174. Id. The court stated that a gun, by its very nature, must be dangerous and must have
the capacity to discharge a bullet with deadly force. Id.
175. Id. at 1216. Additionally, the plaintiff argued that imposing liability upon the manu-
facturer would satisfy the loss spreading function of tort law. Id. at 1213. The court rejected
this argument, stating:
The ability of a gun manufacturer to "spread the loss" is not a sufficient basis for
requiring guiltless purchasers of guns to subsidize the actions of those who use
firearms wrongfully. If it were, then we should simply hold--contrary to estab-
lished principles-that all manufacturers who cannot produce a "fail-safe prod-
uct" are insurers because of their ability to spread loss.





The warning defect cases decided during the Survey period frequently dis-
cussed the issue of duty. These warning defect cases analyzed the relation-
ship of duty to causation. This approach was best demonstrated in Ragsdale
Brothers, Inc. v. Magro.17 7
In Magro the court's discussion of the manufacturer's duty to warn per-
tained to the court's holding on the causation issue. 178 The plaintiff suffered
severe injuries to his hand while cleaning a "bodymaker" machine that pro-
duced beverage cans.179 The accident occurred when a co-worker negli-
gently restarted the machine while the plaintiff was still cleaning it. 180
the plaintiff's cause. The court, however, stated that gun control is a matter for legislative
bodies and should not be imposed by the judiciary on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 1216.
176. Id. at 1214. The plaintiff relied upon Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp.
192, 199 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd sub. nom., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.
1985), in which the district court held that the indiscriminate distribution of handguns to the
public could constitute an ultrahazardous activity under Louisiana law. However, the Patter-
son court distinguishes Richman by stating that the principle involved in Richman is contrary
to Texas law. 608 F. Supp. at 1214. Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed Richman and directed that summary judgment be granted in favor of
the manufacturer. 762 F.2d at 1275. In conclusion, the Patterson court noted:
[T]he unconventional theories advanced in this case (and others) are totally
without merit, a misuse of products liability laws. It makes no sense to charac-
terize any product as "defective" even a handgun-if it performs as intended
and causes injury only because it is intentionally misused. Similarly, the claim
that handgun manufacturers should be held responsible for keeping their prod-
ucts out of the hands of criminals-an admittedly impossible task-is an unsup-
ported, tortured extension of products liability principles. Both theories are
contrary to the established law that a manufacturer is not an insurer of its prod-
ucts; and both theories would, unless logic is abandoned, be applicable to other
products besides handguns.
608 F. Supp. at 1216.
177. 693 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ requested).
178. The court reversed a lower court judgment for the plaintiff and held that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding of causation. The court found more than a scintilla of
evidence that the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate instructions made the machine in
question unreasonably dangerous. Apparently, the court considered the evidence sustaining
the factual insufficiency point with respect to causation in its discussion of the appellant's
matter of law point regarding its duty to warn. Id. at 540-41. The court noted that although
sufficient evidence existed to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff (or his co-worker) would
have heeded an adequate warning, the parties merely raised a fact issue as to the necessity of
warning a user with expertise. The court, therefore, overruled the manufacturer's matter of
law contention that it owed no duty to the plaintiff because the latter possessed expertise or
demonstrated lax judgment. Id. at 541.
179. Id. at 533-34. The cleaning procedure for the "bodymaker" machine required the
machine to be shut down while in its "continuous mode." Additionally, the operator must
open a plastic window on the machine to permit access to the operating area of the machine.
The machine will not operate in the continuous mode while the window remains open. Since
proper cleaning requires that the machine operate on a limited scale while the window is open,
it is possible to do so by changing the machine to the "inch mode." Id.
180. Id. at 534. While the plaintiff was cleaning the machine, a co-worker changed the
machine to the "inch mode" and started the machine's motor. A piston forced down on the
plaintiff's hands and caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. The co-worker later testified that he
activated the machine while the plaintiff's hands were inside it because he failed to pay atten-
tion to the plaintiff's actions. Id. at 538.
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At trial, the jury found the machine to be unreasonably dangerous because
the defendant did not provide adequate instructions on the safe operation of
the machine. The jury also found that such failure was a producing cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. 18 1 The court of appeals began its analysis by noting
that the adequacy of a warning under the circumstances is a question for the
jury.182 The court found that the evidence was legally and factually suffi-
cient to support the jury's findings that the lack of an adequate warning
rendered the machine unreasonably dangerous. 18 3
The court, however, sustained the defendant's factual insufficiency argu-
ment regarding the jury's findings that the failure to warn was a producing
cause of the plaintiff's injury.18 4 Testimony indicated that a warning would
not have prevented the co-worker from activating the machine while the
plaintiff was cleaning it. 185 The court stated that failure to provide an ade-
quate warning is not a producing cause of a plaintiff's injuries when the
plaintiff is an experienced operator of the machine and is aware of the poten-
tial danger.18 6 The court concluded that since the accident would likely
have occurred even with the warning, the jury's finding that the failure to
warn was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injuries was against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence. 187
Magro was tried prior to the supreme court's implementation of a pure
comparative fault scheme for products liability cases in Duncan v. Cessna
181. Id. at 534-35.
182. Id. at 535.
183. Id. at 535-39. The court observed that while conflicting evidence existed on this point,
the law requires the court, in reviewing no evidence points to restrict its review to the evidence
and inferences favorable to the judgment. See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex.
1965); In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). Because more than
a scintilla of evidence existed to support the jury's finding, the court rejected the legal insuffi-
ciency argument and resisted the temptation to substitute its findings for those of the fact
finder. 693 S.W.2d at 538.
184. 693 S.W.2d at 538. The district court had defined producing cause for the jury as "an
efficient, exciting or contributing cause, which, in a natural sequence, produced the... [occur-
rence]. There can be more than one producing cause." Id.
185. The contents of the advocated warning is an important factor in examining the Magro
case. The alleged defect arose from the failure to warn that a second person may activate the
machine. Id. at 539. The opinion is unclear as to whether the plaintiff ever proposed that the
machine was defective for not having a warning to guard against activating the machine before
confirming that no other persons were working on the machine. This ambiguity is important
because the appellate court focuses more on the conduct of the individual who activated the
machine than upon the conduct of the plaintiff who suffered injury as a result of the activation.
Id. at 540-41.
186. Id.; see Blackwell Burner Co. v. Cerda, 644 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (if the person to whom a warning would be directed has
knowledge of the danger, then the failure to warn is not a producing cause of the accident).
187. Id. at 539; see Keeton, Products Liability Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV.
398, 414 (1970), in which Professor Keeton states:
If, however, on the occasion of the damaging event the product was being mis-
used in a way that would have produced the damaging event even if the product
had not been defective, then the unreasonably dangerous condition of the prod-
uct would not be a factual cause of the plaintiff's harm. The sole cause would be




Aircraft Co.'8 8 Thus, the Duncan comparative causation scheme is inappli-
cable to the facts presented in Magro. Under pre-Duncan law evidence of
contributory negligence is a defense only if it rises to the level of misuse or
assumption of the risk. 189 Thus, in a pre-Duncan case, the court would ask
whether a defect existed and, if so, whether the defect caused damages. 190
The plaintiff's negligence would not be relevant unless it rose to the level of
misuse or assumption of the risk.' 9' Although not explicitly stated, the
Magro court apparently believed that the negligence of the co-worker
amounted to an unforeseeable misuse of the product. The Magro court ana-
lyzed the appellant's matter of law point regarding foreseeability and held
that a fact issue was raised on this point, which constituted an essential ele-
ment of the manufacturer's misuse defense. 192 The court noted that the trial
court had submitted an issue on misuse 193 and that upon retrial the matter
would, if properly predicated, be treated in terms of a contributory negli-
gence issue. 1
94
Rego v. Brannon 195 presents an interesting counterpoint to the Magro
analysis of factual sufficiency on the issue of causation in a warning case. In
Rego the manufacturer of a valve involved in a propane gas tank explosion
argued that the evidence supporting the jury's apportionment of responsibil-
ity was factually insufficient because the plaintiff testified that he had not
read the warning carefully. The valve manufacturer contended that this tes-
timony was sufficient to refute the assertion that its failure to place a specific
warning on its valve caused the accident. 196 Unlike the Magro court, the
Rego court recognized the jury's exclusive right to accord weight to the evi-
dence, refused to substitute its judgment for that of the jury, and upheld the
jury finding. 197
During this past year the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit addressed the issue of causation in Horak v. Pullman, Inc.19 8 The
court upheld directed verdicts in favor of the manufacturers of a railroad car
and outlet gate that the plaintiff alleged were defective due to the manufac-
turer's failure to warn of the consequences of an improper opening of the
188. 665 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1984). Magro was tried during July 1982. Duncan's pure com-
parative causation scheme applies to cases tried after July 13, 1983. 693 S.W.2d at 533.
189. First Int'l Bank v. Roper Corp., 686 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. 1985).
190. Id. at 605. Even the post-Duncan analysis would most likely not change the Magro
result. In order to uphold the jury's comparative causation findings, sufficient evidence must
exist to support a finding that the defect caused the plaintiff's injury.
191. Id. at 603.
192. 693 S.W.2d at 541.
193. Id. at 542.
194. Id. (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 655 S.W.2d at 429).
195. 683 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
196. Id. at 681. The plaintiff had apparently left a filled propane gas tank in the rear of his
vehicle on a hot summer day. The valve in question responded appropriately, bleeding pres-
sure in the tank by automatically releasing propane gas. Unfortunately, the gas was released
into the automobile and when the plaintiff entered the car that evening and struck a match, the
gas ignited.
197. Id. at 681.
198. 764 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1985).
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gate.199 Applying the Fifth Circuit standard for review, 200 the court held
that the evidence conclusively established that the plaintiff knew of the risks
posed by the product, thereby eliminating any dispute as to the factual basis
of the manufacturer's affirmative defense. 20 The Fifth Circuit reiterated its
earlier position that the operator's unawareness of the risk is a crucial ele-
ment of the duty to warn. 20 2 The court reasoned that the failure to demon-
strate a causal connection between injuries sustained and the lack of warning
has contributed in part to the generally held view that no duty to warn exists
when the party who would receive the warning has actual knowledge of the
risks posed by the product. 20 3
In Aim v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica20 4 the plaintiff suffered an eye injury
when a bottle cap blew off a soft drink bottle. The plaintiff sued the retailer,
the bottler, and the designer of the bottle capping process. 20 5 The plaintiff
contended that Alcoa, the designer/manufacturer of the bottle capping
machine, failed to warn him adequately that a defectively applied bottle cap
may blow off and cause serious personal injury.20 6 The court of appeals held
that while Alcoa had a duty to warn the bottler of potential dangers, this
duty did not extend to consumers. 20 7 The court stated that Alcoa's duty to
warn ended with the bottler because the bottler was in a better position to
pass on warnings to consumers than Alcoa. 20 8
199. Id. at 1094.
200. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (in review of
evidence on motions for directed verdict, the court should consider all evidence, and if facts
and inferences are so strongly in one party's favor such that no reasonable men could reach a
contrary verdict, then granting the motion is proper).
201. 764 F.2d at 1096; cf Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 340 (5th
Cir. 1984) (court held that defendant bears the burden of proving actual knowledge and re-
manded case because evidence in record was not conclusive).
202. Id. at 1097 (citing Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 102 (5th Cir. 1978)
(applying Texas law)).
203. 764 F.2d at 1096.
204. 687 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ granted).
205. Id. at 377. The retailer and the bottler settled before trial.
206. Id. at 378. The plaintiff also contended that Alcoa negligently designed the bottle and
cap and negligently recommended a visual inspection system instead of devising a fail safe
system. The court found that a broad submission of the negligence and proximate cause issues
made it impossible to determine which act of Alcoa the jury found negligent. Id.
207. Id. at 382. Although noting the lack of legal precedent in Texas for imposing a duty
to warn on designers of a product not actually involved in the manufacturing process, the
court pointed to three cases in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court accepted such a prop-
osition. Id. at 379; see Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391, 395 (Mass. 1980); Uloth
v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1191-92 (Mass. 1978); McDonough v. Whalen, 313
N.E.2d 435, 438-39 (Mass. 1974).
208. The court stated:
This is because Alcoa had no control over the labeling of the soft drinks. The
bottler is the one possessing the adequate means to pass warnings on to consum-
ers. A manufacturer is not liable for miscarriages in the communication process
that are not attributable to his failure to give adequate warning. This may occur
where an intermediate party is notified of the danger, or discovers it himself, and
proceeds to deliberately ignore it and pass the product on without a warning.
687 S.W.2d at 389. Additionally, the court noted that the jury's finding that the bottler was
negligent implied a finding that Alcoa's warning was adequate. Id. Nonetheless, the court
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial based on the insufficiency of evidence for
determining whether Alcoa breached its duty to warn the bottler. Id.
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Justice Junell dissented. He argued that because the parent soft drink
company, and not the bottler, controls the labeling of soft drink bottlers, the
evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence
against Alcoa for failing to warn the plaintiff.209 The supreme court has
granted writ of error on the warning issue.210 The Aim case appears to be
taken as authoritive by the Fifth Circuit. In Leonard v. Aluminum Co. of
America,211 a case involving questions of law and fact strikingly similar to
those in Aim, the Fifth Circuit accepted the Aim opinion as "a definitive
statement of Texas law."'212
C. Instructions to the Jury
Despite the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Acord v. General Motors
Corp.,213 appellate courts during the Survey period continued to discuss the
subject of jury instructions. In First International Bank v. Roper Corp.214
the Texas Supreme Court faced the issue of the propriety of a sole cause
instruction. Noting that the instruction was the type of improper "surplus-
age" that the court had cautioned against in Acord, the court held that the
trial court committed harmful error. 215 The court reasoned that the instruc-
tion was a comment on both the weight of the evidence and the case as a
whole. 216
Later in the year, the Texas Supreme Court in Woods v. Crane Carrier
Co. 217 observed that when courts use terms requiring definition more than
once in a charge, it is preferred that the definition or instruction occur imme-
diately after the general instructions required by part III of rule 226a20 8 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 219 In Woods the jury confronted essen-
tially two issues: the first issue concerned defective design and the second
involved failure to warn. 220 The court noted that although Turner v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.22' requires a definition for "unreasonably dangerous," the
trial court did not define "unreasonably dangerous" specifically in conjunc-
209. Id. at 384 (Junell, J., dissenting).
210. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 5, 5 (Oct. 16, 1985).
211. 767 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1985).
212. Id. at 136.
213. 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. 1984). The court stated: "We explicitly approve the Pat-
tern Jury Charges issue and instruction for design defect cases, and disapprove the addition of
any other instructions in such cases, however correctly they may state the law under § 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Id.
214. 686 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1985).
215. Id. at 604-05.
216. Id. at 605.
217. 693 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1985).
218. TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a, III.
219. 693 S.W.2d at 379.
220. Id. at 378. The first issue was whether the manufacturer defectively designed the
product. The second issue, predicated on an affirmative finding to issue one, inquired as to
causation. Issue three examined whether the defendant should have anticipated the danger.
Issue number four inquired whether the failure to warn rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous. Id.
221. 584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1979).
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tion with the design defect special issues.222 The definition, however, was
given in conjunction with the failure to warn issue. The court specifically
refrained from addressing whether the lower court committed harmful error
by failing to give the "unreasonably dangerous" instruction with the design
defect issue. 223 The court implied that it could have been harmful if the jury
had not reached the issue containing the definition of "unreasonably
dangerous.
'224
In Ford Motor Co. v. Pool 225 the Texarkana court of appeals addressed the
procedure for jury instructions when the plaintiff presents evidence of both
manufacturing and design defects to the jury. The court must separate the
issues and instruct the jury only to the Turner risk-utility test 2 26 in the defec-
tive design issue and only to the consumer expectancy test in the manufac-
turing defect issue. 227 By separating the issues and their respective tests, the
court eliminates the risk of the jury applying the wrong test to the evidence
on an issue.22 8
In Ragsdale Brothers v. Magro229 evidence had brought the issue of a man-
ufacturer's duty to warn before the jury, but the court refused to submit the
defendant-manufacturer's requested instruction on duty to warn those with
expertise to the jury. The San Antonio court of appeals held that the charge
should have included an instruction on duty to warn 230 and that, on retrial,
the court should frame the instruction in terms of contributory negligence in
accordance with Duncan v. Cessna.23 I This ruling was ancillary to the
court's dispositive holding, and the supreme court has granted writ on the
case. The court's observations on this point, therefore, are of questionable
precedential value at this time.
D. Statutes of Limitations
The focus of attention in the area of limitations during the Survey period
was on the "discovery rule" 232 and the applicable statute of limitations in a
breach of warranty action. The Eastland court of appeals applied the "dis-
covery rule" to a products liability case in Corder v. A. H. Robins Co. 233 The
222. 693 S.W.2d at 378.
223. Id. at 378-79.
224. Id. at 379.
225. 688 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ granted).
226. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d at 847. The Turner court set forth that
in strict liability cases involving design defects, courts should instruct the jury to consider "the
utility of the product and the risks involved in its use." Id.
227. 688 S.W.2d at 882.
228. Id.
229. 693 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ granted).
230. The requested instruction was as follows: "There is no duty to warn a group or class
of users who possess special knowledge or expertise concerning the dangerous characteristics
of a product." Id. at 542.
231. Id. at 542-43; see Duncan, 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
232. The "discovery rule," first applied in Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex.
1967), provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until "the plaintiff learned
of or in the exercise reasonable care and diligence should have learned of, the presence of a
foreign object in the body." 417 S.W.2d at 580.
233. 692 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, no writ).
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plaintiff's physician fitted her with a Dalkon Shield intrauterine device in
1971. Plaintiff had the device removed in 1972 due to bleeding and cramp-
ing. The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to conceive a child during the
next few years. The plaintiff consulted several physicians concerning the
infertility problem, yet the plaintiff was unaware until 1980 of the associa-
tion between her infertility and the Dalkon Shield. 234 The plaintiff filed suit
against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield in September, 1981.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant based
upon the statute of limitations.235 In reversing the summary judgment, the
court of appeals relied heavily upon Mann v. A. H. Robins Co., 2 3 6 a case in
which the Fifth Circuit applied the "discovery rule" in a Dalkon Shield
case. 237 In Mann the court held that the statute of limitations did not bar
plaintiff's suit since the plaintiff did not know the cause of her injury until
more than two years after the date of her injury.238 Applying Mann, the
Eastland court of appeals held that because the plaintiff did not know the
true cause of injury until August, 1980, her suit, filed in September, 1981,
was not barred by the statute of limitations.239
Fitzgerald v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.240 involved a personal injury action
brought in terms of breach of an implied warranty of fitness. The Fort
Worth court of appeals held that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued upon
delivery of the product to the plaintiff's employer and not upon occurrence
of the plaintiff's injury.241 The plaintiff in Fitzgerald was a worker who al-
legedly was injured when the blade of a forklift disengaged and fell on his
foot. The plaintiff's injury occurred on August 3, 1977; however, plaintiff
did not file suit until July 30, 1981.242 Realizing that his cause of action for
strict liability was barred by the two-year limitations period, 243 the plaintiff
pursued a breach of implied warranty action 244 and hoped the four-year lim-
itations period would govern.245 The trial court granted the manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that, even under the four-year
period of limitations provided by section 2.725 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code, plaintiff's cause of action was barred. 246 The appellate
court affirmed, observing that a breach of warranty under the section occurs
234. Although a doctor associated her problems with her use of the Dalkon Shield in 1979,
the doctor did not communicate this information to the plaintiff.
235. Id. at 195. The court applied the limitations period found in TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 16.003(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
236. 741 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law).
237. Id. at 80-81.
238. Id. at 80-82; see also Grady v. Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151, 153-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("discovery rule" applied in a case when plaintiff did not
discover for more than two years that excessive radiation caused her injury).
239. 692 S.W.2d at 196-97; see also Wall v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 602 F. Supp.
252, 255 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (asbestosis).
240. 683 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
241. Id. at 166.
242. Id. at 166.
243. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
244. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
245. Id. § 2.725(a).
246. 683 S.W.2d at 163.
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when the manufacturer tenders delivery. 247 Since the manufacturer deliv-
ered the forklift in question to the plaintiff's employer three years before the
injury and over seven years before the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, the court
upheld the trial court ruling. 248
E. Breach of Warranty
During the Survey period courts continued to wrestle with the concept of
breach of warranty in personal injury cases in an attempt to reconcile the
action with the strict products liability concept. In Bernard v. Dresser In-
dustries2 49 an injured pipeline worker sued the manufacturer of a pressure
gauge used to test expansion joints, alleging that the gauge was not fit for its
intended purpose. The plaintiff contended that the manufacturer breached
an implied warranty of merchantability. 250 Citing Garcia v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc.251 the court observed that a cause of action unequivocally exists
under the Uniform Commercial Code for personal injuries resulting from a
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. 252 Although noting that
sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that the gauge in question was
"defective and deficient, 25 3 the court stressed that showing a defect is not
necessary to establish a breach of implied warranty of merchantability.254
The plaintiff must merely prove that the goods are not "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used . . -255 In Boelens v. Redman
Homes, Inc.,2 56 however, the Fifth Circuit held that personal injury claims
arising from breach of warranty are not cognizable under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act.25
7
F Burden of Proof
In Shipp v. General Motors Corp.258 the Fifth Circuit considered whether a
plaintiff must offer evidence addressing each possible criterion in the risk-
utility balancing test in a design defect case.259 Shipp was a crashworthiness
case in which the roof of a Pontiac Trans Am automobile collapsed on the
plaintiff following a single rollover. General Motors contested the suffi-
247. Id. at 165-66.
248. Id.; see also Wall v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 602 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D.
Tex. 1985). But see Morton v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7, 11 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
249. 691 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
250. Id. at 734. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
251. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
252. 691 S.W.2d at 736-37.
253. Id. at 738.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 748 F.2d 1058, 1066 (5th Cir. 1984).
257. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982).
258. 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985).
259. Id. at 421. These criteria include the usefulness and desirability of the product, the
gravity and likelihood of injury from its use, the availability of a substitute product which
would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive, the manufacturer's
ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without seriously impairing its useful-
ness or significantly increasing its costs, and the expectations of the ordinary customer.
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980).
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ciency of evidence supporting the issues of product defect and causation.
Upon appeal the Fifth Circuit rejected General Motor's contention that a
plaintiff must offer evidence as to each criterion of the risk-utility test,
26 °
observing that the Texas Supreme Court has never expressly required that a
strict liability claimant prove each criterion of the balancing test.
26 1
General Motors also attacked the judgment on the ground that the plain-
tiff failed to prove that the defective roof design "legally" caused her injuries,
arguing that in a crashworthiness case the defendant is only liable for "en-
hancement damages."'2 62 General Motors urged that the court follow the
approach adopted by the Third Circuit, 26 3 which requires the plaintiff to
establish the nature and extent of the enhanced injuries. 264 The Fifth Circuit
rejected this invitation, observing that the Texas courts have not explicitly
addressed the burden of proof in crashworthiness cases and that Texas law
of comparative fault does not require the plaintiffs to meet an increased evi-
dentiary burden. 265 Under Texas law, a plaintiff must prove only that a de-
fect was a producing cause of injury.266
G. Negligence of Plaintiff's Employer
In 1983 the Texas Supreme Court, in Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of
Texas, Inc.,267 held that courts could not consider the negligence of the
plaintiff's employer in third-party negligence actions when the employer
subscribed to workers' compensation. 2 68 Erickson v. Harvey Hubbel, Inc.
269
raised the unsettled issue of employer's liability in the context of a strict
products liability action as opposed to negligence. 270 The United States
Court for the Northern District of Texas rejected the plaintiff's invitation to
extend the Varela exclusion to strict products liability actions. 27 1 Noting the
absence of guidance from the Texas Supreme Court, the federal district
judge indicated that he would apply Duncan 272 and treat the employer as a
"settled tortfeasor" for Duncan apportionment purposes.273 This indication
meant that the court would allow the defendant to advance evidence regard-
ing the employer's contributory negligence, and the jury would be able to
consider whether, and in what proportion, that negligence contributed to
260. 750 F.2d at 421.
261. Id. at 422.
262. Id. at 424. General Motors cited the definition of enhancement damages as "that
portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or
injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the
defective design." Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
263. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3rd Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law).
264. 750 F.2d at 424.
265. Id. at 424-25.
266. Id. at 425.
267. 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983).
268. Id. at 561-62.
269. 593 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
270. Id. at 1319.
271. Id. at 1320.
272. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
273. 593 F. Supp. at 1320.
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cause plaintiff's damages. 274  It should be noted that the Texas Supreme
Court decided Duncan after Varela and that the same policy consideration
for insulating a subscribing employer in a third party negligence action
would no doubt exist in a third party strict product liability action.
Herrera v. FMC Corp. 2 7 5 was a products liability case brought by an oil
field worker against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective swivel joint.
The court held that the negligence of the plaintiff's employer may be admit-
ted on the issue of sole cause.276 In its pleadings the defendant manufacturer
alleged that the sole proximate cause of the appellant's injuries was the abuse
or misuse of its product. The appellate court held that the trial court prop-
erly permitted the manufacturer to present evidence showing that the plain-
tiff's employer had misused the product and was negligent in its use.2 7 7
H, Liability of Successor Corporations
The Austin court of appeals rejected the "product line" theory of impos-
ing liability upon a successor corporation in Griggs v. Capitol Machine
Works, Inc.2 7 8 The plaintiff filed a products liability suit against the appellee
and a dissolved corporation bearing the same name for personal injuries re-
sulting from a product manufactured and sold by the dissolved corporation.
The appellee purchased the assets and "going business" of the dissolved
corporation.
In his original petition, the plaintiff alleged that the appellee was liable
because, as successor, the appellee had acquired the going business from the
dissolved corporation in addition to the assets. On this theory, plaintiff
asserted that appellee inherited the liabilities of the dissolved corporation,
including any liability that the court might find in the case. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 279  The plaintiff
appealed.
In rejecting the "product line" theory of liability,280 the court of appeals
began its analysis by discussing the rationale for this theory of successor
corporation liability. 28' The court noted that the "product line" theory gen-
274. Id. at 1320.
275. 672 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. Id. at 8.
277. Id. at 7-8.
278. 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-Austin), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 701 S.W.2d 238
(Tex. 1985).
279. Id. at 290.
280. Id. at 290. The court cited a New Jersey case for the definition of the products line
theory:
[W]here one corporation acquires all or substantially all the manufacturing as-
sets of another ... and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation
as the selling corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for inju-
ries caused by defects in the units of the same product line, even if previously
manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or its predecessor.
690 S.W.2d at 291 (citing Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811, 825
(1981)).
281. 690 S.W.2d at 290-94. Several states have accepted the "product line" theory of liabil-
ity. See Rivers v. Stihl, 434 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Ala. 1983); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22,
33, 560 P.2d 3, 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 582 (1977); Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J.
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erally finds its support in three arguments:
(1) [the successor corporation] may protect itself by purchasing insur-
ance, the cost of which may be passed on to the consumer of the
product;
(2) [the successor corporation] is presumed as a matter of law to have
knowledge of possible hazards existing in products manufactured and
sold by its predecessor, with the incentive and capacity to improve the
product and control the risk in the future;
(3) it is presumed to benefit from the assumed goodwill and reputation
engendered by the predecessor's product and should therefore bear the
corresponding burden of any defect in that product. 282
The court found this rationale fundamentally flawed because it imposes
upon a successor corporation a duty that it cannot possibly perform: a duty
to prevent the specific incident that is the subject of the lawsuit.283 Thus, the
successor corporation becomes an insurer for the wrongs committed by its
predecessor and, as such, does not further the underlying social policies of
strict products liability.284
The Texas Supreme Court refused Griggs' application for writ of error,
finding no reversible error.285 In its per curiam opinion, the supreme court
stated that Griggs' failure to adhere to the summary judgment standards
contained in Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority286 required refusal of
the writ of error application. 287 In conclusion, the court stated that its hold-
ing did not include a ruling on any of the petitioner's points of error.288
Thus, the precedential value of Griggs is questionable.
The Dallas court of appeals in Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co. 28 9 similarly
held that damages could not be recovered against a successor manufacturing
corporation either under the "trust fund theory" 290 or the "de facto merger
332, 431 A.2d 811, 824-25 (1981); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 434
A.2d 106, 110-11 (1981); Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14, 18
(1982).
282. Griggs, 690 S.W.2d at 291 (emphasis in original); see Barringer, Expanding the Prod-
ucts Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1305, 1322-32 (1976).
283. Griggs, 690 S.W.2d at 292. Additionally, the court stated that the "product line"
theory is inconsistent with the duty established by § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS. The court reasoned that the Restatement provision deals with situations in which "the
circumstances and events preceding a plaintiff's injury are within the defendant's exclusive
ability to control." Griggs, 690 S.W.2d at 292 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 35
(comment a) (1965) (emphasis added by the court)).
284. Griggs, 690 S.W.2d at 292-93. The court concluded that decisions adopting the
"product line" theory are result-oriented, relying incorrectly on § 402A. Id. at 293. The court
also stated that Griggs was controlled by Mexican Nat'l Construction Co. v. Middlegge, 75
Tex. 634, 637, 13 S.W. 257, 259 (1890) (mere acquisition of land does not create liability for
damages resulting from predecessor's use of land even though successor landowner continued
the use).
285. Griggs, 701 S.W.2d at 238.
286. 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979).
287. 701 S.W.2d at 238. Specifically, Griggs did not file a response to the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, and thus, may not present any point on appeal that he did not first
present to the trial court. Id.
288. Id.
289. 697 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
290. Id. at 19 (citing Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547 (1981)). The
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doctrine."' 291 The facts in Suarez indicated that an express agreement trans-
ferring liabilities to the successor corporation did not exist and that the
transaction only involved cash. These two factors weighed strongly in the
court's decision. 292 In a different factual setting, the court in Wall v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp. 293 found that the merger agreement in that case did
transfer liabilities; the court thus denied the successor corporation's motion
for summary judgment. 294
Finally, in Webb v. Rodgers Machinery Manufacturing Co., 2 9 5 the Fifth
Circuit addressed the impact of Texas choice of law principles in the context
of a successive manufacturer's liability. The court held that where Califor-
nia had the most significant relationship with the defendant manufacturers,
its law should apply since Texas has adopted the "most significant relation-
ship test."' 296 The court noted that California is one of the jurisdictions that
has adopted the "products line" theory.297
L Asbestosis: Cause of Action or Increased Risk of Developing Cancer
In Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.2 9 8 the Fifth Circuit held that
Texas law permits an asbestosis victim to recover damages for the increased
likelihood that he will develop cancer.299 The court noted that under Texas
law, a plaintiff has only one cause of action for all damages resulting from
the defendant's legal wrong. 3°° For example, an asbestosis victim may not
split his cause of action and sue now for damages resulting from the asbesto-
sis and later, if cancer develops, sue for cancer.30' Texas law requires the
plaintiff to present in one action all his claims for damage resulting from
equitable trust fund theory developed such that creditors of a defunct corporation could pur-
sue assets of the corporation that had been distributed to shareholders. Id. at 19.
291. Id. at 20. The court relied on TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.10 (B) (Vernon
1980), which states:
B. A disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a
corporation requiring the special authorization of the shareholders of the
corporation under Section A of this article:
1) is not considered to be a merger of consolidation pursuant to this Act
or otherwise; and
2) except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute, does not
make the acquiring corporation responsible or liable for any liability or ob-
ligation of the selling corporation that the acquiring corporation did not
expressly assume.
292. 697 S.W.2d at 21.
293. 602 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
294. Id. at 255.
295. 750 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1985).
296. Id. at 374; see Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Tex. 1979).
297. 690 S.W.2d at 291.
298. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
299. Id. at 1137.
300. Id. The court stated that Gideon's suit must encompass all causes of action arising
from the alleged breach of legal duty. Gideon's cause of action could not be split such that he
could recover damages for one disease then later recover damages for any other disease that
develops. Thus, Gideon's claim for damages must include all future damages. Id.
301. Id. The court cited only Houston T. C. Ry. Co. v. Fox, 106 Tex. 317, 320, 166 S.W.
693, 695 (1914) for this proposition.
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exposure to asbestos. 30 2
In order to recover for the increased risk of developing cancer, the plaintiff
must present expert medical testimony that a "reasonable medical possibil-
ity" exists that he will develop an asbsetos related cancer. 30 3 In Gideon the
court allowed the plaintiff to recover for the increased risk of developing
cancer because a qualified physician testified that the plaintiff had a better
than fifty percent chance of developing asbestos related cancer. 30 4 In Dartez
v. Fibreboard Corp.30 5 the court did not allow the plaintiff to recover for the
increased risk of cancer because expert medical testimony established that
the plaintiff would have a less than fifty percent chance of developing cancer
if he stopped smoking cigarettes.
30 6
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTIONS
The Survey period saw the Texas Supreme Court extend the recovery of
nonpecuniary damages to all classes with beneficiaries under the wrongful
death statute. Additionally, the supreme court apparently held that proof of
physical injury is not a prerequisite to the recovery of damages for mental
anguish.
In Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.30 7 the Texas Supreme Court
stated all classes of beneficiaries may recover nonpecuniary damages under
the Texas Wrongful Death Statute. 30 8 The court reasoned that no reason-
able basis existed for differentiating recovery for a wrongful death injury
arising under section 7.1004 from an injury resulting from the wrongful
death of a child.30 9 Citing the landmark case of Sanchez v. Schindler,310 the
302. 761 F.2d at 1137.
303. Id. at 1137-38. The court stated that Texas law requires a plaintiff to prove a future
physical condition through expert medical testimony as to the reasonable probability that the
condition is likely to occur. The plaintiff's burden of proof, preponderance of the evidence,
requires more than a showing of possibility but not necessarily certainty. Id.; see Dartez v.
Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1985).
304. 761 F.2d at 1138.
305. 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985).
306. Id. at 466. The Dartez court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish a reasonable
medical probability of developing cancer. Id.
307. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985). Cavnar also overruled longstanding Texas practice and
permitted prejudgment interest in personal injury cases. See supra notes 57-68 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of prejudgment interest.
308. 696 S.W.2d at 551. The Texas Wrongful Death Statute states that the wrongful death
cause of action "is for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, children, and parents of the
deceased." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.004 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
309. 696 S.W.2d at 551-52. A majority of the appellate courts addressing this issue had
held that non-pecuniary damages are recoverable by all classes of beneficiaries under the
wrongful death act. See Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 1985) (par-
ents may recover non-pecuniary damages resulting from the death of an adult child); Channel
20, Inc. v. World Wide Towers Services, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 551, 556 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (widows
may recover mental anguish damages resulting from the wrongful death of their spouses);
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Vlach, 687 S.W.2d 414, 416-17 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, no writ) (wife and minor children of deceased permitted to recover non-pecuniary dam-
ages); Clifton v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 686 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, writ granted) (widow and minor children may recover non-pecuniary damages); Malone
& Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ dism'd
agr.) (recovery of non-pecuniary damages not limited to parents recovering for the death of
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court held that adult children are entitled to recover damages for mental
anguish resulting from the wrongful death of their mother. 31"
The supreme court in Cavnar arguably overruled the physical injury re-
quirement since both the appellate court and supreme court affirmed the
award of mental anguish damages without any reference to physical injury
suffered by the Cavnar children. The more likely basis for these holdings,
however, is the fact that a finding of gross negligence existed. Under Texas
law this finding is a ground for recovery of mental anguish damages without
further proof of physical injury. 3 12
Several courts of appeal, however, addressed the issue of mental anguish
directly, with varying results. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Vlach 313
the Houston court of appeals held that proof of physical injury is not a pre-
requisite to the recovery of damages for mental anguish.31 4 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reached the same
result in Channel 20, Inc. v. World Wide Towers Services, Inc. 315 The Dallas
court of appeals, however, did require proof of a physical injury as a prereq-
uisite to recovery of mental anguish damages in Air Florida, Inc. v. Zon-
dler3 16 and McKee v. Covert.317 Additionally, Clifton v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Co. 31 8 may suggest a third alternative. In Clifton the court
stated that "mental suffering proof requires a showing of psychic and/or
physical injuries directly inflicted upon the mind of the claimant. ' 31 9 Thus,
Clifton may permit the recovery of mental anguish damages without strict
proof of physical injury.
In Taylor v. Parr32° the court held that the managing conservators of a
handicapped child could not bring a wrongful death action because the stat-
minor children); Air Florida, Inc. v. Zondler, 683 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984,
no writ) (widow and children may recover non-pecuniary damages); Cavnar v. Quality Control
Parking, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984), rev'd in part, 28 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 466, 468 (June 5, 1985). Contra Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 674 S.W.2d 447,
661 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ granted) (Sanchez is limited to its particular facts).
310. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
311. 696 S.W.2d at 552-53.
312. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 258 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
313. 687 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
314. Id. at 417. In reaching its result, the court relied upon its interpretation of Sanchez
and found no requirement that a plaintiff prove such physical manifestations in order to re-
cover for mental anguish. Id.
315. 607 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. Tex. 1985). The court based its result upon its interpretation
of Sanchez. Id. at 556.
316. 683 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ). The Air Florida court looked
to pre-Sanchez law in determining that damages for mental anguish are only available if "the
plaintiff showed an intentional tort, gross negligence, willful and wanton disregard, or an ac-
companying physical injury." Id. (citing Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617
S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1981)). The Air Florida court concluded that Sanchez did not change
prior law. 683 S.W.2d at 773. The court stated that it disagreed with the interpretation that
Sanchez eliminated the physical injury requirement enunciated in Baptist Hosp. of Southeast
Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298-99 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ granted).
317. 680 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
318. 686 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ granted).
319. Id. at 315.
320. 678 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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utory cause of action is limited to parents, children, and spouses. 321 The
court stated that since there is no common law wrongful death cause of ac-
tion, addressing the problem raised by this case is a matter for the
legislature. 32
2
321. Id. at 529-30.
322. Id.
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